Bypass Record
Code-Signing Abuse × Apple iOS CoreTrust kernel extension
A publicly-reported instance of Code-Signing Abuse bypassing Apple iOS CoreTrust kernel extension, recorded with its original source. Factual record; no assessment of any specific deployment.
Mechanism
The exploit manipulates MachO code signatures by inserting two SignerInfo structures into the CMS blob: one with a valid signature from an untrusted identity, and another with an invalid signature from an App Store identity. CoreTrust incorrectly trusts the binary as App Store-signed, allowing execution with arbitrary entitlements.
Detection & mitigation
Monitor for processes with anomalous code-signing attributes, such as binaries that appear Apple-signed but request entitlements inconsistent with their bundle ID or origin. Enforce application control policies that validate certificate chains and flag discrepancies in CMS signature structures.
This is a record of a publicly-reported event, not an assessment of any specific organization's deployment. Detection and mitigation notes are drawn from the cited source. Where the source is silent, fields are omitted.